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Abstract
This study is aimed at the examination of rail infrastructure state funding, its pre-conditions, the assessment of its needs and 
factors that can impact its amount and forms. Mainly, the Latvian railway case was examined; however, it was found that in the
all Baltic States the state funding for rail infrastructure should cover subsequences of internal failures and external regulations of 
the rail market and its amount depends on state facility to adopt political programs to internal market terms.© 2014 The Authors. 
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Kaunas University of Technology.
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1. Introduction
For avoiding injustices in charging and allocation of the rail infrastructure, the European Commission uses 
regulation and provides common European Union open information and open access policy as well as charge 
limitation that should be equal to the “cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating the train service” and 
raised only with external costs and with mark-ups if “market can bear it”. Member States have to provide a public 
financing if an infrastructure manager can not balance its expenses with charges over a reasonable time period. The 
public funding should not be limited to “direct State funding”, but also other means should be considered “such as 
public private partnership and private sector financing” as well. 
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The necessity of any state funding of a rail infrastructure raises some kind of resistance on the Baltic States 
authorities, due to the fact that up to now access charges have covered infrastructure manager’s total costs at about 
100% (Thompson L., 2008). Further more, Latvian railways, for example, distributes dozens million dividends to 
state and at the same time shows positive traffic volume dynamics. These practices, in spite of Latvian railways 
strong objections in investment needs, evoke public suspicions that even the enquiry of rail state funding is an 
attempt to manipulate with government financing or is a kind of jobbery. This disbelief may be caused by lack of 
understanding of situation in existing transportation market of the Baltic States. For instance, KPMG International 
study on the competitiveness of seaports in the Baltic region (Masane-Ose  J., 2013) concluded that the 
transshipment throought Baltic ports in the last decade has increased, but the market share has decreased 
significantly owing to the development of Russian seaports. This trend is emergent for significant part of transit 
transportation in the region.
On the other hand, distrust, condemnation, criticism and other type of negative emotions towards monopoly 
power of a rail infrastructure manager and expectations of its determinantial effects to charge level exert a 
considerable impact to internal cooperation among railway undertakers. Less frequently someone refers to needs to 
compete among transit corridors as a common supply chain. The common opinion is that, someone, usually a 
monopolist is to blame (Preston J., 2008). Therefore, more and more additional legislation restrictions and 
obligations are required for rail infrastructure managers from internal market stakeholders as well. 
This study is aimed at the examination of rail infrastructure state funding, its pre-conditions, the assessment of its 
needs and factors that can impact its amount and forms within “Member States with an important share of rail traffic 
with third countries which have the same railway gauge which is different from the main rail network”, providing 
priority to Latvian railway case. This study could be also interesting for “main rail network” undertakers, because as 
a result of establishing a single European railway area many of existing separate rail infratsructures become parts of 
common logistic chain and will face problems that exist in the Baltic States railroads due to their captive position on 
CIS countries’ rail networks.
2. Method
Methods of generalization and syntethys of scientific literature were used in this study. During the research process 
more than thirty highly cited research papers and literature reviews on cases of different countries were collected. 
Later, the diversity in pre-conditions, that determine state funding, as well as methods of those regulations were 
capitalized. After, distinction features of Baltic state railways funding were stored and pieces of information that are 
relevant to those items were extracted from each document. Afterwards, the ideas having general application were 
chosen and verificated for the Baltic states case. The conclusions were based both on the interpretation of the 
cumulative study results and on the assessing of existing situation in Baltic state railways. 
3. Results
A rail market has natural imperfections that appear affected by the heavy and long-run capital investments  
(Waters W., 2007). There is no chance to quickly adapt production of the rail infrastructure capacity to short-run 
demand of transported product markets. The decrease of average costs could be the result of operations scale 
(Waters W., 2007) with predictable demand only. This distinction of railways doesn’t match current changes in 
production and logistic strategies, which are switching to the ‘just in time’ method (Woroniuk C., Marinov M. et al., 
2013). 
The obligations of infrastructure managers to implicate the three perfect competition market characteristics (open 
access, charges at marginal cost level and open information) unless they have inherent distinctions in other market 
conditions (limited number of market participants, incontestability, transport corridor and transport mode differences 
by technical characteristics, oppressive price) don’t assist in correcting rail market natural imperfections. Further 
more, the intervention in market mechanism creates additional social costs:
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1. costs of open access obligations: small-scale paratransit operators induce frictions in longrun train 
scheduling and losses in capacity, compete in ‘‘cream skimming’’ style, “save” on safety, taxes and labor abuses; 
big number of operators leads to inco-ordinate investments and insurance (Cervero R., Golub A., 2007);
2. costs of charge limiting: marginal cost theory normally is focused on single product firms (Waters W., 
2007), but in rail economics products differ just during transportation (according to nature of assets, traffic volumes, 
background conditions, population density, locational patterns, different climate, different laws, customs or 
behavioural pattern) (van den Bossche M. et al., 2005) and obligation to calculate these non-signicances in real time 
and at advance would cost valuably; the alternative for natural cross-subsidy of light density lines or more less 
solvent freights is state funds only; the bordered set of decision makers about charge level (Jansson, K., 1993)
promote lobbying processes;
3. costs of open information: rail infrastructure managers have to publish their plans about development 
projects of the railway infrastructure, prices etc. but don’t have complete information about all processes taking 
place in the market it works due to its multilayer dependence from markets that work without state regulation,  like 
concrete cargo market and cargo consumers’ market.
Rail transport is forced to compete with other transport modes that are responsible for traffic congestion, extra 
fuel consumption, higher accident level and air pollution (Pittman R., 2007). It is too complicate to connect 
beneficiaries of the rail transport externalities to a concrete government level (municipal, state or EU) in order to 
adjust competition using taxes or subsidies. Further more, the society is not ready to accept that a large group of 
taxpayers should pay for the externalities for a very small group of rail undertakers (Proost S.et al., 2007).
4. Conclusions
As a result of the study it could be concluded that there are pre-conditions of rail infrastructure state funding in 
the Baltic States that should cover subsequences of internal failures and external regulations of the rail market and 
its amount depends on state facility to adopt political programs to internal markets.
Assesing the impact of the observed factors to the outcomes of the rail infrastructure, it could be concluded, that 
existing transports development objectives in the Baltic States have not been fully supported by the infrastructure 
manager due to limited motivation of rail market stakeholders and lack of investment facilities.
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